By Lotte Govaerts
This post is part of my series on the historical archaeology of the River Basin Surveys and my sub-series on the Oahe Dam. In my previous post in this series, I provided some background information on the Great Sioux Reservation. In this post, I will discuss the effects of the dam on the people of Cheyenne River Reservation.
The impacts of the Pick–Sloan dams on the Sioux peoples have been studied extensively by Michael Lawson, going back to his 1973 master’s thesis, in which he focused on the Cheyenne River Reservation in particular. He later examined the other reservations in more detail as well for his doctoral thesis and published that research in Dammed Indians: The Pick-Sloan Plan and the Missouri River Sioux, 1944–1980 (Lawson 1982). That book was later updated and republished as Dammed Indians Revisited: The Continuing History of the Pick-Sloan Plan and the Missouri River Sioux (Lawson 2009). The second version of the book includes several new chapters that describe events that occurred since the publication of the first book. The bulk of this blog post constitutes an extremely brief summary of some of the issues described in Lawson’s research. Much more detail can be found in the cited works.
Cheyenne River Reservation Before the Oahe Dam
When the Great Sioux Reservation was created, the US government established agencies where the Indian agents distributed annuities and monitored the various populations associated with these agencies. The Cheyenne River Agency was established on the Missouri, ten miles south of the Cheyenne River, to serve approximately 6,000 Minneconjou, Itazipco (Sans Arc), Sihasapa (Blackfeet) and Oohanunpa (Two Kettle) Lakota (Lawson 1973, p. 39). In 1889, Cheyenne River Reservation was established when the Great Sioux Reservation was broken up. The original site of Cheyenne River Agency was outside the boundaries of the new reservation; therefore, the agency was moved 55 miles upstream in 1891, across the river from the settler town of Forrest City (Lawson 1973, p. 50).
Cheyenne River Reservation included approximately 2,804,000 acres when it was first established (Lawson 1973, p. 33). It was reduced in size several times before the Oahe Dam was constructed. Among other things, in 1900, the Milwaukee Railroad obtained a six-mile right-of-way through an 87-mile stretch of the reservation. The Indian Bureau[1] leased 1,500,000 acres to a cattle syndicate in 1902. in 1908, the government opened non-allotted lands to white settlers, and in 1910, additional unallotted land was sold to a development company for the construction of several towns (Lawson 1973, p. 55–56). In the 1920s and 1930s, during periods of drought and agricultural depression, many Cheyenne River Reservation residents were forced to sell their allotments (Lawson 1973, p. 57–59).
In 1934, the Wheeler–Howard Act or Indian Reorganization Act provided the Sioux tribes with some level of self-government. It also ended allotment (Lawson 1973, p. 59; Lawson 2009, p. 32).[2] In 1937, the new Cheyenne River Tribal Council established a land consolidation program. This increased tribal land holdings from approximately 492,000 to over 798,000 by 1950. Of those, however, 390,000 acres remained in heirship status and 200,000 acres of the best grazing land was still leased to the Western Farm Management Company (Lawson 1973, p. 76).
Oahe Dam Negotiations
The Flood Control Act of 1944 did not include any details regarding Native lands; it did not authorize the taking of any lands and included no provisions regarding tribal interests. (Lawson 2009, p. 43). None of the Sioux tribes were kept informed during the planning and the finalized Pick–Sloan Plan was presented to them as inevitable. In 1946, as the Three Tribes of Fort Berthold were fighting the construction of Garrison Dam (see Meyer 1977), the Office of Indian Affairs established the Missouri River Basin Investigation Project (MRBI) to examine the situation, conduct surveys to estimate the social and economic effects of the dams, and calculate the cost of damages and/or replacement (Lawson 1973, p. 22). Its duties were later expanded to include helping the tribes obtain equitable settlements and assisting them with relocation and reconstruction. The first MRBI findings were not published until 1949, when dam construction had been proceeding for several years. It was only then that the affected populations learned the precise impacts of the ongoing project (Lawson 2009, p. 45–46).
The construction of Oahe Dam, the third of the Pick–Sloan dams, began in 1948. Armed not only with the experience of dealing with the US government for generations, but also with knowledge gained from the Three Tribes’ experience with the Garrison Dam and that of the Yankton Sioux with the Fort Randall Dam (which I will discuss in a future blog post), the Cheyenne River Sioux were prepared to negotiate the best possible deal if construction was indeed inevitable. The US government also had some experience with dam-related negotiations at this point and was hoping to make the process go more smoothly than it had previously. Therefore, legislation was enacted in 1950 that assigned responsibility for the negotiations to the Army Chief of Engineers and the Secretary of the Interior. It stipulated also that the settlement was to include not only payment for the land, but the cost of relocation as well. This legislation further required both the Corps of Engineers and the Bureau of Indian Affairs to prepare appraisals and it gave individuals the right to reject those appraisals and have the value of their land determined in federal court at the Army’s expense. If no agreement could be reached, Congress would make the final decision (Lawson 1973, p. 87–89; 2009, p. 93–94).
The existence of this legislation provided the Cheyenne River Sioux with some reassurance, but they nonetheless remained concerned as several provisions had been dropped as the original proposal was finalized into legislation, particularly those relating to rights to electrical power from the dam, legal representation in the negotiations, and shoreline access (Lawson 1973, p. 89; 2009, p. 94–95).
Similar to what occurred in negotiations with other impacted populations, during the Cheyenne River Reservation negotiations the appraisals of the US Army Corps of Engineers (USACE), the Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA), and tribal officials were vastly different. The BIA was willing to compromise, but the USACE refused to do so and repeatedly threatened to use its powers of eminent domain. The negotiations lasted much longer than provided for and failed to result in an agreement (Lawson 2009, p. 95).
A private firm hired by the USACE in 1951 concluded that the total value of the land that would be lost in the Cheyenne River Reservation was $1,605,410 (Lawson 1973, p. 94; 2009, p. 102). Both the MRBI and tribal negotiators pointed out errors in the USACE’s appraisal, leading to reviews and additional negotiations (Lawson 1973, p. 95–96; 2009, p 103–107). A joint committee was appointed to conduct a new appraisal in 1952 (Lawson 1973, p. 97; 2009, p. 108).
However, when new negotiations were started, the Corps offered the same amount as during previous negotiations. The reviewing committee’s appraisal, $2,053,177, became the BIA’s official offer (Lawson 1973, p. 98–99; 2009, p. 109). Tribal representatives pointed out errors in both appraisals and arrived at an amount of $2,614,779 for land, improvements, and severance damages, in addition to $8,316,092 for “tangible future damages” (things like loss of grazing leases, timber, wildlife, and wild fruits), and $12,599.432 to establish a rehabilitation program,[3] totaling $23,530,303 (Lawson 1973, p. 100; 2009, p. 109). This amount was intended to reimburse the entire reservation, as not only individual property owners would be impacted by the dam. In addition, the Cheyenne River Sioux suggested that relocation and construction costs should not come out of the settlement funds but out of the dam project’s budget. They also asked for mineral and grazing rights and a block of electricity, among other things (Lawson 1973, p. 103–105; 2009, p. 110–111).
As an agreement could not be reached, the Cheyenne River Sioux proceeded to deal with Congress directly (Lawson 1973, p. 109; 2009, p. 112). They lowered their total to $21,715,678 and this amended proposal was introduced in Congress in early 1953 (Lawson 1973, p. 110; 2009, p. 113). After much back and forth, the total amount eventually passed by Congress in 1954 was reduced to $10,644,014 (Lawson 1973, p. 112–117; 2009, p. 120–124). The Cheyenne River Sioux’s demands for electrical power and facilities were denied and they were not allowed final authority over disbursement. Even the significantly reduced amount of the final settlement provided the Cheyenne River Sioux with more money per acre than the groups who negotiated with the government before them. In addition, they also won the right to have relocation and reconstruction costs come out of the Army’s appropriations and they received mineral, salvage, and shoreline rights (with certain restrictions) (Lawson 1973, p. 119–120; 2009, p. 125–126). As it was clear that no other options remained at this point, a majority of Cheyenne River residents voted to accept the proposal. On April 6, 1955, the settlement became official. (Lawson 1973, p. 123; 2009, p. 126).
Oahe Dam Impacts
Based on information from the MRBI appraisals, when the reservoir was filled in 1958–1962, Lake Oahe flooded 104,420 acres of Cheyenne River Reservation land (58,444 acres owned by the tribe, 45,976 by individuals). The reservation lost its most fertile land and most of its timber resources. This included 403 acres of cropland that produced 75% of the corn and 10% of the small grain on the reservation as well as 12,360 acres of meadowland, 12,412 acres of sheltered pastureland, and 75,087 acres of choice grazing land (Lawson 1973, p. 78–79). This land supported the reservation’s livestock industry, which was thriving despite the limitations caused by the effects of the Dawes Act that split the land into plots too small to support ranching (Lawson 1973, p. 74). More than 75 cattle enterprises had to be liquidated or relocated. Several ranchers lost all their bottomlands, crop lands, and pastureland, in addition to the headquarters for their business. They were thus left with only the upland grazing areas (Lawson 1973, p. 79).
These lands could not be replaced because no lands with similar features remained on or near the reservation after the reservoir was filled. The grazing lands outside the flood zone could not support an economic unit without the adjoining meadows and sheltered pastures and as such were difficult to dispose of; therefore, the market value of the remaining land declined as well (Lawson 1973, p. 79–80).
Approximately 15,000 acres of woodland, representing 90% of the timbered area on the reservation, was lost. This timber represented the only source of fuel for at least a quarter of the Cheyenne River Reservation population. Many of them also depended on it for lumber and food supply. These lands could also not be replaced (Lawson 1973, p. 80–81).
The town of Cheyenne Agency, the administrative headquarters and the main population center of the reservation was also in the flooded area. The town included government and tribal buildings, a boarding school, hospital, dormitories for students, tribal and government offices and workshops, and the homes of 600 people. The town was also home to a 105-acre school farm that provided partial subsistence for students, as well as several churches and cemeteries (Lawson 1973, p. 82). The reservation’s administrative center was moved to the existing, non-Native town of Eagle Butte. Over 650 people were moved to temporary housing there while new housing was constructed for them (Lawson 1973, p. 136).
Aside from employment opportunities during relocation and reconstruction, the benefits of the dam largely did not manifest for the Cheyenne River Sioux (Lawson 148–160). The rehabilitation project that was part of the reconstruction program experienced numerous problems, mainly because it was implemented too quickly (Lawson 1973, p. 167–170), but the associated land consolidation program (which was assisted by other federal and tribal funds) was rather successful. Between 1950 and 1970, tribal land holdings increased while non-tribal holdings within the reservation decreased; in this way, the amount of land held by tribal members increased from 787,381 to 1,231,037 acres (Lawson 1973, p. 170–171).
Although the Cheyenne River Sioux, through various programs, managed to increase their tribal assets, brought the average family income above the poverty line, and achieved the lowest unemployment rate of the major Sioux reservations, they continued to feel hampered by the damages suffered due to the Oahe project (Lawson 1973, p. 170–171).
Negotiations for Additional Compensation
In the 1980s, renewed efforts on the part of the North Dakota tribes resulted in additional compensation, as I have briefly mentioned in a previous post and will explain in more detail in the next post in this series when I discuss the impacts of the Oahe Dam on the Standing Rock Reservation. Following the North Dakota tribes’ success, the Cheyenne River Sioux started seeking additional compensation in 1993. They followed an approach similar to the one used by the Standing Rock Sioux to arrive at an estimate of $300.7 million in 1996 dollars. An alternative approach to calculate their losses resulted in an estimate of $279.1 million (Lawson 2009, p. 269).
Negotiations lasted until 2000 (Lawson 2009, p. 270). On November 13 of that year, President Clinton signed the Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe Equitable Compensation Act into law as Title I of Public Law 106-511. It provided for the appropriation of $290,722,958 (plus interest) from the general fund of the US Treasury in a recovery trust fund, to be capitalized in 2012 (Lawson 2009, p. 280). This trust fund was the largest settlement ever awarded to a Native tribe impacted by a Pick–Sloan project. Similar to the other trust funds set up for these populations, the Cheyenne River legislation prohibited per-capita distribution of interest income to individuals; it thus did not provide any direct payments to individuals who lost land or any of their relatives or descendants.
The differences between the settlements received by the different groups and the different methods to calculate the amounts the US government felt the tribes were owed remain a topic of debate. According to Lawson (2009, p. 286), the only conclusion that can be drawn based on the analysis of these differences is that Congress was as erratic in providing additional compensation as it had been in providing the initial settlements associated with the Pick–Sloan dams and that thus the total compensation for different groups experiencing similar damages cannot be considered equitable.
The Mitigation Act
The Three Affiliated Tribes of Fort Berthold and Standing Rock Sioux Tribe Equitable Compensation Act included a provision that returned “surplus” USACE lands (i.e., those lands taken by the USACE for the dam project that were located above the flood management level of the lake) to the North Dakota tribes. This provision was incredibly unpopular with non-Native North Dakotans, particularly those who used the lake and shoreline for recreation and those whose businesses depended on that recreation. The legislation was later repealed; the repeal authorized the USACE to administratively transfer the lands to the Department of the Interior to be held in trust for the tribes (Biolsi 2021, p. 217).
In the 1990s, while the previously discussed negotiations regarding additional compensation for the taking of the land were still ongoing, the state of South Dakota pursued legislation to transfer USACE-owned surplus lands outside of reservation boundaries to the state and to transfer USACE-owned surplus lands inside reservation boundaries back to the tribes (and provide both state and tribes with funds for wildlife rehabilitation) (Lawson 2009, p. 231; Biolsi 2012, p. 212–214). The idea of returning these lands to the tribes was as unpopular with non-Native South Dakotans as it had been in North Dakota, but the state was interested in owning the land outright so it could have jurisdiction over hunting, fishing, and recreation on the shore and the water. In practice, the state was already exercising this jurisdiction, but legally, it had no actual jurisdiction, as the land was federally owned. The state was hoping to make its jurisdiction official without risking additional lawsuits from the tribes and therefore offered those tribes the lands located within the reservation boundaries (Biolsi 2021, p. 220–221).
South Dakota commenced negotiations with all the Missouri River tribes, but only the Cheyenne River and Lower Brule Sioux were willing to continue negotiating and eventually reached an agreement with the state. The issue of jurisdiction was a significant obstacle in these negotiations, as some sort of shared jurisdiction would have to be established to govern the water and shoreline, and the tribes recognized that sharing jurisdiction on tribal land meant accepting state jurisdiction over tribal members on tribal land, which had long been a contested and painful issue (Biolsi 2021, 227–228).
In the eventual legislation, Title VI of the Water Resources Development Act of 1999, better known as the Mitigation Bill, USACE lands outside reservation boundaries (as understood by the US government) were transferred or leased to the state. Lands within the reservation boundaries, totaling approximately 33,000 acres for Cheyenne River Reservation, were transferred to the Department of the Interior to be held in trust for the tribes. The existing jurisdictions remained unchanged. Both the tribes and the state received trust funds for habitat restoration (capitalized at $57 million for the Cheyenne River and Lower Brule Sioux) (Lawson 2009, p. 233–234).
This legislation was extremely controversial. The other Sioux tribes opposed it, as did many individual members of the Cheyenne River and Lower Brule Sioux tribes. The disagreement was largely based on their understanding of tribal boundaries (and sovereignty). Because the Fort Laramie Treaty of 1868 was the last treaty the Sioux signed with the US (the US stopped signing treaties with tribes shortly after), many consider the boundaries described in that treaty the only valid boundaries of the Sioux territory. Treaty rights and sovereignty cannot be negotiated away without the approval of all the Sioux tribes, and lands within the Great Sioux Reservation boundaries therefore cannot be transferred to the state without that approval (Biolsi 2021, p. 224–225). In addition, many expressed concern that cultural resources on these lands would be irreparably damaged if removed from federal protection (Lawson 2009, p. 232).[4] Despite this opposition and a slew of lawsuits, the lands were officially transferred in 2002. The bill was, however, amended in 2000; among other things, a Cultural Resources Advisory Commission was established for the protection of cultural resources on the transferred lands and the secretary of the Interior was authorized to inventory and stabilize every historic and cultural site on the transferred lands within a period of ten years (Lawson 2009, p. 234).
To be Continued
The Sioux tribes and individuals within those tribes have filed multiple lawsuits against the US government over these and related issues. Considering the inequitable settlements discussed here, the US government’s shifting attitudes toward tribal sovereignty (Fouberg 2000; Biolsi 2021), and the issue of Indigenous water rights in the face of climate change, the story of Oahe Dam’s impacts is an ongoing one.
This concludes my review of the impacts of the Oahe Dam on the Cheyenne River Reservation. In the next installment of this series, I will take a closer look at the impacts of the dam on the Standing Rock Reservation. Then, I will discuss the historic sites investigated by River Basin Surveys archaeologists in the Oahe Dam area.
[1] The Bureau of Indian Affairs was known by different names, including the Indian Bureau, the Indian department, and the Indian Service until it was officially named the Bureau of Indian Affairs in 1947 (BIA 2021).
[2] The Indian Reorganization Act was part of the “Indian New Deal”, which represented a turn away from the federal government previous focus on assimilation in its dealings with Native peoples. It soon shifted back, however, as not long after World War II, termination became a popular idea in the federal government. Ideas on Indian policy shifted with changes in leadership and these various political shifts directly affected the negotiations between the Sioux and the US government regarding the Pick–Sloan dams, as Lawson (1973, 2009) makes abundantly clear throughout his analysis. For more information on the Indian Reorganization Act and the Indian termination policy, see Deloria 2002 and Valandra 2010. For an analysis on the US government’s interpretation of Indigenous sovereignty and how this has affected the Cheyenne River Sioux in particular, see Fouberg 2000.
[3] “Rehabilitation program” was a term used for loans and grants to improve social and economic development on reservations during the Indian New Deal period (Lawson 2009, p. 109).
[4] The National Historic Preservation Act (NHPA), the Archaeological Resources Protection Act (ARPA), and the Native American Graves Protection and Repatriation Act (NAGPRA) govern interaction with Native American cultural resources, burials, and human remains on federal land.
References
Biolsi, Thomas. 2021. “The Treaty Imaginary and Tribal Sovereignty in South Dakota.” American Indian Quarterly 45 (3): 209–49. https://doi.org/10.1353/aiq.2021.0019.
Deloria, Vine Jr. 2002. The Indian Reorganization Act: Congresses and Bills. University of Oklahoma Press.
Fouberg, Erin Hogan. 2000. Tribal Territory, Sovereignty, and Governance: A Study of the Cheyenne River and Lake Traverse Indian Reservations. Native Americans. New York: Routledge.
Keith, Stephanie. 2018 “Riding with Native Americans to Mark Pact Anniversary.” Reuters (website). Augusts 9 2018. https://widerimage.reuters.com/story/riding-with-native-americans-to-mark-pact-anniversary. Accessed March 6, 2024.
Lawson, Michael L. 1973. “Reservoir and Reservation: The Oahe Dam and the Cheyenne River Sioux.” Master’s Thesis, Omaha: University of Nebraska.
Lawson, Michael L. 1976. “The Oahe Dam and the Standing Rock Sioux.” South Dakota History 6 (2): 203–29.
Lawson, Michael L. 1982. Dammed Indians: The Pick-Sloan Plan and the Missouri River Sioux, 1944-1980. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press.
Lawson, Michael L. 2009. Dammed Indians Revisited: The Continuing History of the Pick-Sloan Plan and the Missouri River Sioux. Pierre: South Dakota State Historical Society Press.
Meyer, Roy W. 1977. The Village Indians of the Upper Missouri: The Mandans, Hidatsas, and Arikaras. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press.
Ostler, Jeffrey. 2004. The Plains Sioux and U.S. Colonialism from Lewis and Clark to Wounded Knee. Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press.
U.S. Department of the Interior, Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA). 2021. “What Is the BIA’s History?" (website) January 12, 2021. https://www.bia.gov/faqs/what-bias-history. Accessed March 6, 2024.
Valandra, Edward Charles. 2010. Not without Our Consent: Lakota Resistance to Termination, 1950-59. University of Illinois Press.
Previous posts in this series
What is Historical Archaeology?
How the River Basin Surveys Shaped Historical Archaeology
The Upper Missouri River Basin in the Nineteenth Century: Fur Trade
The Upper Missouri River Basin in the Nineteenth Century: Military Frontier
The Upper Missouri River Basin in the Nineteenth Century: Indian Agencies
Lake Sakakawea and the Woman it was Named After
Garrison Dam Archaeology: Village Sites
Garrison Dam Archaeology: 32MN1 - Fort Floyd
Garrison Dam Archaeology: 32ML2 – Like-A-Fishhook Village and Fort Berthold
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